Here, Malaya and Kenya offer lessons for Iraq. The insurgency is the driving force behind Iraq’s sectarian violence containing it is therefore a prerequisite for curbing the sectarian bloodletting. ![]() So what is to be done?Ĭontain the Insurgency. and Iraqi efforts to contain, if not reduce, the violence. Identifying the factors that give rise to and perpetuate such conflicts-drawing on insights from insurgencies and civil wars elsewhere, and proposing practical steps for dealing with them-will be critical to U.S. It is now clear, however, that a strategy of political co-optation will not, in and of itself, bring an end to either the insurgency or the country’s sectarian bloodletting, which show every sign of intensifying.Īccordingly, there is a need for interim measures to contain Iraq’s sectarian violence. domestic support for the war effort, and heighten communal tensions throughout the Middle East-is therefore essential if the United States is to achieve its minimal objectives in Iraq.īecause the Sunni Arab insurgency and the sectarian violence it has spawned are driven in part by political grievance and ambition, it was hoped that the formation of a broad-based“national unity” government that included representatives of the Sunni Arab community would help stanch the violence. Quelling this violence-which threatens to derail that country’s troubled political transition, devastate the Iraqi people, inflict lasting harm on the country’s social fabric and economy, erode flagging U.S. ![]() ![]() Sectarian violence has now surpassed the insurgency as the main security challenge in Iraq.
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